Obid-khori Nazarov, the emigre Uzbek imam who survived an assassination attempt in Sweden last week, is still hanging on, in critical condition in a Swedish hospital, uznews.net reports as of February 24:
“His doctors have informed us that he remains in a very serious if not critical condition,” said Per Thelen, a spokesman for the police in the town of Jämtland.
The imam was shot multiple times and once in the head, which means his condition will remain serious for some time, but there isn't an update this week. Police are investigating the assault at a national and international level, says uznet.
And they are ruling out extreme nationalists as possible culprits. In the little town of Stromsund, there apparently is only one radical nationalist (!) and police say "It's not him."
I think it's highly unlikely it's any kind of European nationalist for the simple reason that Nazarov was not a public figure speaking in Swedish or English. He was known in the Uzbek community, but while those in the field are familiar with his story, he's not an international figure. Of course, there might be just some random hater who felt like there were "too many" Muslims emigrating to Sweden, but that doesn't seem likely.
What is far, far more likely is that the SBU, the Uzbek intelligence agency, executed or engineered this attack. The imam was on his way to prayers at the mosque when he was shot (not coming from the mosque, as originally reported. That suggests someone could have been watching him and known his schedule.
You would think the Uzbek regime would appreciate a moderate Muslim who said he did not believe in violent overthrow of the government and did not believe in the imposition of a caliphate or theological government and would leave him alone -- but they don't at all, and that's what we have to realize.
There's an idea in some circles that the West should promote moderate Islam as a kind of preferable option in Muslim countries. But I think this is wishful thinking, because if there's anything that a regime like Karimov's would hate, it's something that might actually be successful in replacing him and that might actually be successful in gaining support in the country.
Was Nazarov growing more popular? He seemed popular enough -- I don't know, I don't have the facts.
The hypothesis that some rival Uzbek emigre shot him also doesn't seem plausible. There don't seem to be enemies or rivals of this type -- it's not as if some more extreme believer seemed upset with him (that I can tell -- we don't know of course). The secular journalists who criticized his unwillingness to endorse free speech of course aren't the sort of people who will shoot anyone.
Uzbek refugees are all telling the Swedish media that they believe the assassination attempt is the work of the SBU, says uznews.net. And they're likely right, and not only Sweden, but all European countries providing reguge to Uzbeks need to examine how safe they are, and need to be confronting the Uzbek government with questions.
The imam's followers are praying for him, and human rights activists in Europe are calling for an international investigation, uznews.net reports:
Mutabar Tajibaeva, the prominent activist now based in France, and the political commentator Kamoliddin Rabbimov used the term ‘outrage’ to describe their reaction to the crime which took place on 22nd February in the Swedish town of Stromsund when a man opened fire on Obid-kori Nazarov.
They outlined again the incredibly tough life story he has had:
From 1990-96, Nazarov was the Imam of the Tukhtaboy mosque in Tashkent. In 1996 he was sacked from this post and his house near the mosque was demolished on government orders.
In 1998, criminal charges, which according to Tajibaeva and Rabbimova were fabricated, were brought against Nazarov, forcing him to flee Uzbekistan.
In 2004, in Tashkent, his son Khusnuddin disappeared without a trace just after being questioned by the Tashkent police. His whereabouts are still not known.
Nazarov was tracked down to Kazakhstan where he had gone into hiding. In autumn 2005 a group of his associates were detained by the Kazakh security forces and then handed over to Uzbekistan.
In 2006 Nazarov was allowed to enter Sweden as a refugee. But even there the Uzbek authorities did not leave him alone, demanding that the Swedish authorities extradite him to Uzbekistan.
Nazarov was granted asylum in Sweden, and a Swedish tabloid described his case at the time.
He is also known as Obidkhon Sobitkhony, says AP, and they also added that international media is denied access to Uzbekistan. That's an interesting admission not often made -- but it's true that foreign reporters are very scarce in Tashkent.
Now why are the Uzbek secret police chasing him so hard? Because he has a following, and because if he is as moderate as he claims, then he's a lot, lot harder to discredit, especially to the secular elites. And the more they have chased him -- and now with this assassination -- the more the SBM likely makes him more popular.
I believe that even when a person is a victim of a terrible act of oppression like this, a blow against religious liberty for everyone, precisely because he is a public figure addressing public issues, you have to be able to discuss the significance of his public teachings. I light a candle in my church and pray for his recovery and the safety of all our Uzbek colleagues in emigration and I worry about "defamation of religions".
Registan.net leaves out any controversy surrounding the iman, and any criticism. This isn't just reticence about a victim; it's part of the culture of the Registan/Eurasia/liberal think-tanks to remain uncritical about Islam in Central Asia, and posit some bogey-man of a conservative, illiberal intolerant Muslim-hating "power" somewhere that is whipping up hate and evil, rights-eroding wars on terrorism over simple religious belief. Here's the relevant paragraph:
Nazarov is an interesting religious figure. A conservative who emerged from the now in retrospect freewheeling period of religious debate in final years of the Soviet Union and early years of independence, he is originally from Namangan, but he made his name preaching at Tashkent’s Tokhtaboi Mosque. Frank and Mamatov, describing recordings of his lectures, say that his common sense and humor contributed to his popularity. Monica Whitlock’s The Land Beyond the River describes Nazarov’s troubles with the Uzbek state and the official religious establishment. In his words, he said he became a target when he refused to praise the government in his sermons, and he turned the accusation that he politicized religion on its head, saying that it was the state politicizing faith by forcing clerics to serve the state. After he accepted a gift of literature from Ferghanachi, Uzbeks who had settled in Saudi Arabia, he was accused of being a Saudi agent. What finally led to his expulsion as imam of Tokhtaboi was a sermon condemning the disappearance of Abduvali Mirzaev, another conservative, independent imam who angered Karimov’s government.
When seeing this much "texture" of "expertise," few dare to ask what the implications are for the secular space in society. The Uzbek government claims Nazarov is linked to terrorism -- this likely has no merit whatsoever, knowing how much Tashkent lies and covers up these cases.
I think you have to keep an open mind and criticize what is a threat to liberty anywhere, and that's both this assassination attempt and any attempt to suppress free media or women's rights in the name of Islam.
But Registan continues to weave the wishful thinking about "if only" moderate Islam were allowed to thrive, why, it would "expose" extremists and all would be well:
Nazarov’s theology is very conservative and overlaps with that of Central Asian extremists, but there is no compelling evidence that he is in fact involved with terrorist organizations. In past statements, he seems to suggest, in a somewhat cryptic fashion, that had he (and presumably other conservative imams) been able to openly preach in Uzbekistan, he would have been able to identify and defuse violent extremists.
As for me, I shall remain true to myself. We have been very open up to now. But the government is forcing our congregation to choose: either to go with the Muftiat, or to hid. If some new underground movement starts, I shall not be able to answer for it.
Number one, if this "very conservative" ideology in fact "overlaps" with extremists, then...you have to condemn that extremism. It's not acceptable in a liberal democratic society such as the Registanis rely on themselves for their intellectual existence, and there's no reason not to advocate it for even authoritarian countries like Uzbekistan.
Number two, I'm not at all a believer in the "power to diffuse" of the moderates. If anything, the extremists would likely target figures not as orthodox as they are as greater threats even than the Sovietized secular state of Karimov, and Karimov may even artificially pump up some extremists as an object lesson to scare others away (and lure some innocents to certain torture and jail).
And how does this "diffusing" system work, exactly? Moderate imams get to decide who is extremist and send them to jail in this unjust system? How is that different than having the state do the same thing? Or theoretically, they get to attract young, enthusiastic people, or for that matter, old, desperate people in larger numbers and keep them away from the extremists. How's that thesis coming along? It's not the ideas of some moderate Muslim in some American university that are spreading in Uzbekistan; it's the ideology of Hizb-ut-Tahir and other groups because they likely offer less ambiguity and they are likely more zealous about preaching.
I think the entire concept of religious engineering has to be questioned.
